e assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which subset of products to o er to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are constructed by xing a threshold revenue π and then choosing all products with revenue at least π . is is known as the revenue-ordered assortments strategy. Our rst contribution is an analysis of the performance of the revenue-ordered assortments strategy making only minimal assumptions about the underlying discrete choice model: We assume that consumers behave rationally, in the sense that the probability of choosing a speci c product x ∈ S when given a choice set S cannot increase if S is enlarged.
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is rationality assumption, known as regularity, is satis ed by almost all models studied in the revenue management and choice theory literature. is includes in particular all random utility models, as well as other models introduced recently such as the additive perturbed utility model, the hi ing fuzzy a ention model, and models obtained using a non-additive random utility function. We provide three types of revenue guarantees for revenue-ordered assortments: If there are k distinct revenues r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r k associated with the products (listed in increasing order), then revenue-ordered assortments approximate the optimum revenue to within a factor of
where ν is de ned with respect to an optimal assortment S * as the ratio between the probability of just buying a product and that of buying a product with highest revenue in S * . ese three guarantees are in general incomparable, that is, (A), (B), or (C) can be the largest depending on the instance. We also show that the three bounds (A), (B), and (C) are exactly tight, in the sense that none of the bounds remains true if multiplied by a factor (1 + ϵ) for any ϵ > 0.
When applied to the special case of Mixed MNL models, bound (B) improves the recent analysis of revenueordered assortments by Rusmevichientong et al. [1] , who showed a bound of 1/(e(1 + ln(r k /r 1 ))).
Our second contribution is to draw a connection between assortment optimisation and some pricing problems studied in the theoretical computer science literature by showing that these pricing problems can be restated as an assortment problem under a discrete choice model satisfying the above-mentioned rationality assumption. is includes unit demand envy-free pricing problems and the Stackelberg minimum spanning tree problem. Building on that connection, we then observe that a well-studied heuristic in that area called uniform pricing corresponds in fact to the revenue-ordered assortment strategy for the speci cally constructed discrete choice models. As a consequence, our revenue guarantees for revenue-ordered assortments apply. Interestingly, the resulting bounds match and unify known results on uniform pricing that were proved separately in the literature for the envy-free pricing problems and the Stackelberg minimum spanning tree problem.
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